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ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN LABOR MARKETS:
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S EFFORTS
Michael Murray*
Several recent filings in labor antitrust cases by the U.S. Department of
Justice’s Antitrust Division as amicus curiae have prompted significant
discussion in the bench, the bar, and the industry. The Division has expanded its amicus brief program, which has been in place since at least
1975, in order to further the proper administration of the antitrust laws.
In the labor space, the Division filed several amicus briefs that detail
some of its views on the application of antitrust laws to no-poach agreements, that is, agreements among companies about the hiring of each
other’s employees. Specifically, the Division has set forth its framework
for assessing whether such agreements are subject to the per se rule, the
rule of reason, or so-called “quick look” analysis. Under the Department’s framework, the key questions are whether the entities in the nopoach agreement are capable of concerted action, whether those entities
are competitors, whether the entities’ agreement is ancillary to a larger
arrangement, and whether the agreement merits a “quick look.” This
article, adapted from a speech in March 2019, describes the Division’s
amicus program, provides a brief historical survey of the interaction of
antitrust and labor law, including enforcement activities, and outlines
the Division’s approach to no-poach agreements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I am here to talk about the Department of Justice’s antitrust initiatives in the labor space. The Department has been active in this area for
many years, perhaps most prominently several years ago with a series of
settlements concerning no-poach agreements and technology companies.1 I would like to discuss the Department’s current activities, including several recent amicus filings that have prompted discussion in the
bench, the bar, and the industry. My goal is to set these filings in both
historical and legal context, to provide a better understanding of the Department’s views in this important area of antitrust practice.
II. THE DIVISION’S AMICUS PROGRAM
Before turning to that task, I would like to briefly discuss the related
initiative that gave rise to those filings. There have been quite a few
stories in the press recently about the Department’s renewed focus on its
amicus program, which consists of the Department’s discretionary filings in private antitrust cases.2 Commentators are saying that the Antitrust Division (“the Division”) is “get[ting] off the sidelines”3 and “seeking to make its voice heard.”4 The reaction to our filings has ranged
from encouragement to hostility—encouragement from those we are
supporting and hostility from those we are not supporting.5 It turns out

1. See, e.g., United States v. eBay, Inc., No. 12-cv-5869, Final Judgment, Doc. 66 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 2, 2014); United States v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 1:10-cv-1629, Final Judgment,
Doc. 17 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2011); see United States v. Lucasfilm Ltd., No. 1:10-cv-2220, Final
Judgment, Doc. 7 (D.D.C. June 3, 2011); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Requires Six High Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements (Sept. 24, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-six-high-tech-companies-stop-entering-anticompetitive-employee.
2. The Antitrust Division’s Competition Advocacy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 28,
2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-operations/division-update-spring-2019/antitrust-division-s-competition-advocacy.
3. Bryan Koenig & Matthew Perlman, DOJ Antitrust Division Gets Off the Sidelines,
LAW360 (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1126818/doj-antitrust-divisiongets-off-the-sidelines.
4. Karen Hoffman Lent & Kenneth Schwartz, Antitrust Division Increasingly Weighs
In as Amicus Curiae, 261 N.Y. L.J. 1 (Feb. 11, 2019).
5. See infra Part III.
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the age-old adage of “where you stand depends on where you sit” is fully
applicable to antitrust.6
This reaction to our amicus program is half accurate. It is true that
we are making an active amicus program a priority. Specifically, as our
Assistant Attorney General, Makan Delrahim, told Congress, we are trying to expand our amicus program in order to “more proactively and
more effectively promote the use of antitrust and competition principles
across the judiciary.”7 To that end, we filed significantly more briefs in
2018 than 2017 (nine versus one), and if the current rate holds we will
double that again in 2019, to approximately twenty briefs.8
But it has been our legal obligation since at least 1975 to file amicus
briefs as a way to enforce antitrust laws. In that year, Attorney General
Levi codified a delegation of authority to the Assistant Attorney General
of the Antitrust Division.9 The text of it, which still exists today, provides that several “functions are assigned to and shall be conducted, handled, or supervised by” the Assistant Attorney General of the Antitrust
Division and that these functions consist of, among other things, “[g]eneral enforcement . . . of the Federal antitrust laws and other laws relating
to the protection of competition and the prohibition of restraints of trade
and monopolization, including . . . participation as amicus curiae in private antitrust litigation.”10 So although our focus is renewed, it is wellgrounded. It should be no surprise that we are doing what we are tasked
to do.
That the amicus program is discretionary, though, raises a significant question: how do we decide which cases to pursue? The answer is
that we learn of significant antitrust cases in the same way that scholars
do: we search for them in the reporters and the dockets, we read about
them in the news, and parties and organizations bring them to our attention. It is increasingly common for parties and organizations to come to
us with a pitch about a case that they believe raises significant issues.

6. This adage is now attributed to a government official from the Bureau of Budget in
1949. See Rufus Miles, The Origin and Meaning of Miles’ Law, 5 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 399
(1978).
7. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Assistant Attorney General Makan
Delrahim Before the Senate Subcommittee on Antirust, Competition Policy and Consumer
Rights (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/statement-assistant-attorney-generalmakan-delrahim-senate-subcommittee-antitrust-competition.
8. Antitrust Division, Appellate Briefs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/appellate-briefs. This count does not include Supreme Court filings, which are the primary responsibility of the Office of the Solicitor General. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.20(a). There were three Supreme Court amicus cases involving the Division in 2018 and
one in 2017.
9. Revising Delegations of Authority to the Antitrust Division, 40 Fed. Reg. 36118
(Aug. 19, 1975).
10. 28 C.F.R. § 0.40(a).
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That makes a lot of sense, because it is likely that we are already reviewing the case, and parties reasonably believe that it is useful for them to
try to persuade us of their view of the case. In this way, our amicus
program is becoming somewhat similar to the amicus program of the
Solicitor General, in which parties routinely advocate in person and in
writing that the Solicitor General file an amicus brief on their side in the
Supreme Court.11 This is now a routine part of our practice.
We sort through these cases in the same way that we sort through
which affirmative cases to bring in our criminal and civil programs: we
exercise prosecutorial discretion. We are guided by the oath that we take
as federal employees to “support and defend the Constitution” and
“faithfully discharge the duties of [our] office.”12 And we balance resource and policy constraints with the interest of the United States in a
proper administration of the law.13 Indeed, the very fact that we are more
active on the amicus front appears to redound to the benefit of the interest
of the United States: by discouraging private parties from making the
more extreme versions of their arguments, due to the possibility of a
contrary United States amicus brief that could undermine their credibility.
A review of our filings indicates that we are willing to file on a wide
variety of topics, from immunities and exemptions to the topic of these
remarks, labor, to which I will now turn.14
III. RECENT LABOR AMICUS FILINGS
We have recently offered several filings to courts considering the
proper standard for assessing market allocations in a labor market.
The reactions to our position have been swift and fierce. The first
filing, in the Western District of Pennsylvania, took the position that nopoach agreements among competitors are per se unlawful unless they are
ancillary to a separate legitimate transaction or collaboration.15 This
11. Robert L. Stern & Eugene Gressman, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 6.41 (9th ed.
2007).
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331.
13. For example, subsequent to filing a Statement of Interest in one no-poach case, the
Division intervened in the case for the purpose of entering into the settlement with the defendant. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Seaman v. Duke Univ. et al.,
No. 1:15-cv-462, Dkt. No. 325 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2019); Order, Seaman v. Duke Univ. et al.,
No. 1:15-cv-462, Dkt. No. 362 (M.D.N.C. May 22, 2019).
14. See generally Antitrust Division, Appellate Briefs, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 28,
2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/appellate-briefs.
15. Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust
Litig., No. 2:18-mc-798, Doc. 158, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2019). Subsequent to the date of
this speech, the court accepted this argument in In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust
Litig., No. 2:18-mc-798, 2019 WL 2542241, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 20, 2019) (accepting Division’s argument on per se rule). The Division also filed a similar statement in a different case,
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position has been characterized by certain defense-friendly lawyers as
an unsupported assertion based on lawless guidance that creates a
“trap,”16 but hailed by plaintiff-friendly attorneys as pro-worker plaintiff.17 The second filing, in Washington State, explained that no-poach
agreements in the franchise context are likely subject to the rule of reason.18 This position has been called a “welcome clarification” by defense-friendly lawyers19 but has been criticized by plaintiff-friendly lawyers as pro-business defendant.20 We have not been able to please all of
the people all of the time.
But of course, that is fine with us, because we are not in the business
of satisfying a particular constituency. Our Assistant Attorney General
has promised that “[w]e will be the officious inter-meddlers in random
cases,” that “[w]e’re not going to take anybody’s side, but the side of
what we believe . . . the law . . . should be . . . .”21 I am reminded of the
see Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Seaman v. Duke Univ. et al., No.
1:15-cv-462, Dkt. No. 325, at **19-29 (Mar. 7, 2019), and subsequently intervened in that
case for the purpose of entering into the settlement with the defendant. See Order Granting
the United States of America’s Unopposed Motion to Intervene, Seaman v. Duke Univ. et al.,
No. 1:15-cv-462, Dkt. No. 362 (May 22, 2019).
16. James Tierney & Alex Okuliar, DOJ and FTC Set Possible Criminal Liability Trap
for HR Professionals, ORRICK ANTITRUST WATCH (Oct. 24, 2016), https://blogs.orrick.com/antitrust/2016/10/24/doj-and-ftc-set-possible-criminal-liability-trap-for-hr-professionals/; Reply Brief for Defendants, In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig.,
No. 2:18-mc-798, Doc. 163 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2019). See also Boris Bershetyn et al., Expert
Analysis: DOJ Is Trying to Rein in Franchise No-Poach Suits, LAW360 (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/1130056/doj-is-trying-to-rein-in-franchiseno-poach-suits.
17. See Randy M. Stutz, The Evolving Antitrust Treatment of Labor-Market Restraints:
From Theory to Practice, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 18 (July 31, 2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-Labor-Antitrust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf; see also
Boris Bershetyn et al., Expert Analysis: DOJ Is Trying to Rein in Franchise No-Poach Suits,
LAW360 (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/1130056/doj-istrying-to-rein-in-franchise-no-poach-suits (suggesting that the Department’s position in recent cases is a “welcome clarification” of the law that developed after the 2016 guidance).
18. Notice of Intent to File Statement of Interest, Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc., No. 2:18cv-00244, Doc. 24 (Jan. 25, 2019). Subsequent to the date of this speech, the parties settled
these cases. Two courts subsequently considered the issues raised in the Statement. In one
court, a respected district court judge, who took over for a retired district court judge that
authored a decision cited in the Statement and this speech, declined to reconsider the retired
judge’s ruling. See Conrad v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, No. 318-CV-00133, 2019 WL
2754864, at *1-2 (S.D. Ill. May 21, 2019). In the second court, the district court judge generally accepted the arguments in the Statement, concluding that rule of reason analysis should
be applied to the no-poach allegations in that case. See Ogden v. Little Caesar Enterprises,
Inc. et al., No. 18-12792 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2019).
19. See, e.g., Boris Bershetyn et al., Expert Analysis: DOJ Is Trying to Rein in Franchise
No-Poach Suits, LAW360 (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.law360.com/foodbeverage/articles/1130056/doj-is-trying-to-rein-in-franchise-no-poach-suits.
20. See Stutz, supra note 17; see also Bershetyn et al., supra note 19.
21. Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., What’s ahead at the Justice Department?,
First Annual Conference at the Antitrust Research Foundation at George Mason University:
What’s ahead in antitrust? (Jan. 19, 2018).
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famous line from T.S. Eliot’s Murder in the Cathedral. Archbishop
Thomas Becket is foreseeing his eventual murder for standing on principle against the king. He then is confronted by four tempters who propose pathways forward. The first three advise him to do the wrong thing
to avoid death, but the last urges him to do the right thing, to accept
death, but not because it is right to stand on principle but rather because
it would make him famous. Becket responds that “The last temptation
is the greatest treason: To do the right deed for the wrong reason.”22 In
our amicus program, as our Assistant Attorney General said, we try to
take the right position for the right reason, not because of the likely reaction. In this way, the amicus program parallels the mission of the university. The good faculty member writes articles to advance the truth,
for the motivation of advancing the truth, and not to be popular, or to get
tenure, or to be liked by students, or to get on television.
What all this means is that the best way to understand our position
in the labor antitrust space is not through a simplistic pro-labor or probusiness paradigm. Rather, our position is best understood through the
lens of the rule of law and as informed by history and doctrine.
IV. HISTORY: LABOR AND ANTITRUST
I will first briefly discuss the historical relationship between antitrust law and labor markets. I do this for two reasons: first, it is critical
to understanding the Department’s position; second, I am not aware of
any authority—law review, trade publication, or treatise—that provides
a detailed survey tailored for this purpose.
The historical relationship between antitrust law and labor markets
is long and complicated. It dates at least to the 1890s. In discussing
what became the Sherman Act on the floor of the Senate, Senator Sherman himself pointed to the power of monopoly to “command[] the price
of labor.”23 Indeed, Senator Sherman’s Act does not distinguish between
labor and product markets.24 Subsequently, employers used antitrust law
to fight labor unionization before the passage of the Clayton Act.25 Then,
a complex body of statutory and nonstatutory exemptions arose to address the intersection of antitrust law and labor markets.26 Over time,

22. T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 22-44 (1935).
23. Cong. Rec. 2455, 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
24. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Workingmen’s Amalgamated Council of New Orleans, 54
F. 994, 996 (C.C.E.D. La. 1893).
26. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (statutory exemption); Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (statutory exemption); Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, 113 (statutory exemption);
see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235-37 (1996) (nonstatutory exemption).
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antitrust litigation in labor markets has become “rare,”27 at least relative
to other antitrust litigation. But that is not because the laws do not apply.28
Quite the contrary: federal antitrust enforcers long have been active
in this space, and in particularly relevant ways for at least the past
twenty-five years.29 In the early 1990s, the FTC challenged nursing
homes’ practice of boycotting registries for temporary nursing services
and the Council of Fashion Designers’ attempt to reduce the fees and
other terms of compensation for models.30 The United States, for its part,
sued a Utah society for human resources professionals for sharing wage
information that caused the matching of wages.31 In 2007, the Department also sued an Arizona Hospital Association for setting a uniform
rate for per diem nurses.32
And, of course, in this decade, the Department pursued civil enforcement actions against several major technology companies that entered into stand-alone (or, in industry parlance, “naked”) no-poach
agreements regarding their competitors’ employees.33 At that time, significantly, the Department alleged that the behavior constituted a per se
violation.34
This enforcement focus on the labor markets has become even more
acute in the past few years. In October 2016, the Division and the FTC
issued their Antitrust Guidance for Human Resources Professionals.35
As the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General recently summarized, “[t]he Guidelines cautioned that naked agreements among employers not to recruit certain employees, or not to compete on employee
27. Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market
Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 570 (2018).
28. See Brown v. Pro Football, 50 F.3d 1041, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1995); but see Carroll v.
Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 512 F.2d 4, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1975).
29. Some private cases also have been litigated; they often involved ancillary restraints.
See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001); Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d
509 (2d Cir. 1999); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981); Nichols
v. Spencer Int’l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967); Union Circulation Co. v. Fed. Trade
Comm’n, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957).
30. See In re Debes Corp., (F.T.C. 1991); see also In re Council of Fashion Designers of
Am., et al., 120 F.T.C. 817 (1995).
31. See generally United States v. Utah Soc’y for Healthcare Human Res. Admin., et al.,
No. 94-C-282G, 1994 WL 729931 (D. Utah Sept. 12, 1994).
32. See generally United States et al. v. Ariz. Hosp. and Healthcare Ass’n and AZHHA
Serv. Corp., No. CV07-1030, Doc. 17 (D. Ariz. Sept. 12, 2007).
33. See, e.g., United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1033-34 (N.D. Cal.
2013); Garrison v. Oracle Corp., 159 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1053-55 (N.D. Cal. 2016); see also In
re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1172-73 (N.D. Cal. 2013); In re
Animation Workers Antitrust Litig., 123 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1181-84 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
34. See eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
35. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidance
for HR Professionals (Oct. 2016), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download.
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compensation, are per se illegal and may thereafter be prosecuted criminally.”36
These Guidelines are notable in many ways. They are directed to
HR professionals, which is not our usual target audience for policy pronouncements. Perhaps as a result, the Guidelines do not really argue for
their viewpoint: they do not contain case citations or in-depth analysis
of the law, but rather a few references to previous enforcement actions
and several broad pronouncements in lay English. Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of the audience and the message, critics have viewed those
pronouncements as ambiguous in important respects. For example, critics claim that the Guidelines are unclear as to whether settlements among
companies litigating trade secrets cases are running afoul of the antitrust
laws.37
For these reasons and others, the Guidelines remind me of a famous
Seinfeld episode. Jerry arrives at a car rental agency to rent a car, having
previously reserved a mid-size. The clerk tells him that they’re out of
mid-sizes. Jerry responds: “But the reservation keeps the car here.
That’s why you have the reservation.” The clerk says: “I know why we
have reservations.” Jerry replies: “I don’t think you do. If you did, I’d
have a car. See, you know how to take the reservation, you just don’t
know how to hold the reservation and that’s really the most important
part of the reservation, the holding. Anybody can just take them.”38 In
my view, the Guidelines are like the reservation: anyone can put out
Guidelines. The key is making them workable, explaining them, and
justifying them, so that they can actually guide people.
The Division’s current leadership has endeavored to do just that.
About a year ago, Principal Deputy Andrew Finch announced that for
unlawful per se “agreements that began after the date of th[e] announcement [of the Guidelines], or that began before but continued after that
announcement, the Division expects to pursue criminal

36. Acting As’t Att’y Gen. Andrew C. Finch, Antitrust Division, Remarks at Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 10 (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-andrew-finch-delivers-remarks-globalantitrust.
37. See Karin Johnson & Kevin Cloutier, New Guidance for HR Professionals Regarding
Wage Fixing and No Poaching Agreements, SHEPPARD MULLIN LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (Dec.
2, 2016), https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2016/12/articles/antitrust/new-guidance-for-hr-professionals-regarding-wage-fixing-and-no-poaching-agreements-highlightsnew-focus-on-criminal-prosecutions-and-raises-new-concerns-for-employer/.
38. See Seinfeld: The Alternate Side (NBC television broadcast Dec. 4, 1991).
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charges.”39 Around the same time, our Assistant Attorney General explained that there are pending criminal investigations on this topic.40
The Department’s first enforcement action, in the case known as
Wabtec, followed shortly thereafter.41 There, the Department successfully sued two of the largest railway producers in the country for agreeing not to poach each other’s employees, in the process alleging that the
defendants’ actions constituted a per se violation of the antitrust laws.42
The Department did not pursue criminal charges in that case because the
agreement did not continue past the date of the announcement of the
Guidelines.
Where does that leave us? I think the following summary is fair:
the Division has a longstanding enforcement interest in the labor space,
including the no-poach space, and has taken the position, consistent with
case law, that naked no poach agreements are per se violations of the
antitrust laws.
V. THE DEPARTMENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
That brings me to our recent filings. This is really a story of, as the
Deputy Attorney General recently remarked, quoting the Book of Ecclesiastes, “there is nothing new under the sun.”43 For in light of this history, it is no surprise that our recent filings have taken the position that
naked no poach agreements among competitors are per se violations
while no poach agreements that are not naked or not among competitors
are subject to the rule of reason.
But I will spell out the proper thinking about these cases. I do so
because the Guidelines lack this detail. The corresponding caveat is that
the Division is not so presumptuous to believe that it has all of the
39. Principal Deputy As’t Att’y Gen. Andrew C. Finch, Antitrust Division, Remarks at
the Heritage Foundation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 5 (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-andrew-c-finch-delivers-remarks-heritage.
40. Matthew Perlman, Delrahim Says Criminal No Poach Cases are in the Works,
LAW360 (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1003788/delrahim-says-criminalno-poach-cases-are-in-the-works.
41. Complaint, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv-00747-CKK, Doc. 1, at
*2-3 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018).
42. See generally Final Judgment, United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG, No. 1:18-cv00747, Doc. 19 (D.D.C. July 11, 2018); see also Complaint, United States v. Knorr-Bremse
AG, No. 1:18-cv-00747-CKK, Doc. 1, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2018) (“Defendants’ no-poach
agreements are per se unlawful restraints of trade.”).
43. Ecclesiastes 1:9 (“The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which
is done is that which shall be done: and there is no new thing under the sun.”); see Dep. Att’y
Gen. Rod Rosenstein, U.S. Remarks at Wharton School’s Legal Studies and Business Ethics
Lecture Series, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rod-j-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-whartonschool-s-legal-studies.
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answers in this space, but I do believe that these are the right questions
to ask in a systematic way:44 whether the entities in the no-poach agreement are capable of concerted action, whether those entities are competitors, whether the entities’ agreement is ancillary to a larger arrangement,
and whether the agreement merits a “quick look.”45
A. Concerted Action
The first relevant question is whether the entities that allegedly entered into a no-poach agreement are capable of the “concerted action”
required by Section 1.46 Copperweld and American Needle provide the
test to be applied to this question: “The relevant inquiry . . . is whether
there is a contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy amongst separate
economic actors pursuing separate economic interests, such that the
agreement deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decision
making.”47
In the typical case, applying these precedents is not a difficult inquiry. Separate, unrelated corporations competing in the market for
widgets are clearly “independent centers of decision-making.”48 But, in
other cases, the inquiry can be more complicated because at its core it is
fact-specific, based on what the Court called “a functional consideration
of how the parties involved in the alleged anticompetitive conduct actually operate.”49
For example, in the franchise context, at least one circuit court—
the Ninth Circuit—has held that franchisors and franchisees are a single
entity exempt from Section 1.50 In that case, the franchisor of Jack-inthe-Box restaurants required its franchisees to consent to a “no-switching” agreement, by which franchisees agree not to hire the manager of
another franchisee’s Jack-in-the-Box within six months of that manager’s termination from the other franchisee’s Jack-in-the-Box without
the consent of the other Jack-in-the-Box franchisee.51 A manager sued
44. I do not endeavor to address how these questions should be assessed under Twombly
and Iqbal at the pleading stage.
45. For a similar discussion about the proper questions, see generally expert analysis by
Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition issues in labour markets, OECD (June 5, 2019),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-concerns-in-labour-markets.htm; see infra Section V.B.3.
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (applying only to “contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy”); see 12
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1402A at 148 (3d ed. 2012) (“The Sherman Act §
1 reaches ‘concerted action’ . . .”).
47. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 195 (2010) (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted)).
48. Am. Needle, 560 U.S. at 195 (quoting Copperweld, 560 U.S. at 186).
49. Id. at 191.
50. See Williams v. I.B. Fischer Nev., 999 F.2d 445, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1993).
51. Id. at 447.
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his franchisee and the franchisor under the Sherman Act.52 The district
court held, among other things, that the franchisee and franchisor were a
“common enterprise incapable of conspiring” under the Sherman Act.53
The court of appeals affirmed, relying on the district court’s extensive
factual analysis about the degree of control by the franchisor over the
business of the franchisee—what the district court called the franchisor’s
exercise of “plenary control” over the franchisee.54
But that decision—which, importantly, pre-dates American Needle55—“require[d]” and turned on “an examination of the particular facts
of [the] case.”56 Indeed, a district court in the same circuit after American Needle reached the opposite conclusion, based on the allegations and
facts in its case.57 In that case, an employee of the franchisor Cinnabon
sued Cinnabon and its franchisee for including a no-poach clause in the
franchise agreement. 58 The district court recited the American Needle
test and then held that the employee sufficiently alleged that the franchisor and franchisee were independent centers of decision making in light
of the facts.59 The court distinguished the Ninth Circuit case Williams v.
I.B. Fischer Nevada as turning on its particular facts.60
In sum, whether separate companies—be they companies in a franchisor/franchisee relationship or another arrangement—are capable of
concerted action is a complicated question of fact.61

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Williams v. Nev., 794 F. Supp. 1026, 1030-31 (D. Nev. 1992); Williams,
794 F. Supp. at 1032 (“This plenary control, in addition to [the franchisor]’s and [franchisee]’s
common economic goals, make them a single enterprise, incapable of competing for purposes
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”).
55. Professor Hovenkamp persuasively argues that this “conclusion is incorrect in light
of American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010).” Herbert Hovenkamp, Competition
issues in labour markets, OECD (June 5, 2019), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-concerns-in-labour-markets.htm.
56. I.B. Fischer Nev., at 447.
57. See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No.
18-5627, Doc. 33, at **5-7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018) (discussed infra). Other courts have
not addressed the issue explicitly but have taken as a premise that the entities were separate
centers of decision making. See also Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 331 F. Supp. 3d
786, 789 (S.D. Ill. 2018) (proceeding to next step of analysis); Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA,
LLC, No. 17-C-4857, 2018 WL 3105955, at **4-8 (N.D. Ill. June 25, 2018) (same, citing
Copperweld); but see Danforth & Assoc., Inc. v. Coldwell Banker Real Estate, LLC, No. C101621, 2011 WL 338798, *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2011) (applying Fischer in one sentence of
analysis without citing American Needle).
58. Yi v. SK Bakeries, LLC, No. 18-5627, Doc. 33, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 13, 2018).
59. Id. at 5-6.
60. Id. at 6-7.
61. That is not to say that this question cannot be addressed on the pleadings under
Twombly and Iqbal in some cases.
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B. Standard of Law: Per Se Rule or Rule of Reason
Assuming the relevant parties are capable of concerted action, the
next item on the agenda is determining the proper standard of law—the
per se rule or the rule of reason.
1. Competitors
The next question, consequently, is whether the entities that allegedly entered into a no-poach agreement are competitors in the labor market; that is, whether there is a horizontal relationship among them with
respect to the alleged no-poach agreement. I emphasize here that companies can be competitors in the labor market but not competitors in
product or service markets. Companies in different industries can compete in the same market for employees. But if they are not competitors
in the labor market but instead are, for example, vertically related in their
industry, then any agreement among them is subject to the rule of reason.62 That is black-letter law as a general matter—most recently reaffirmed in Amex—and longstanding law in the franchise context as well
since at least Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.63 Franchisors
and franchisees, of course, are primarily in a vertical relationship in their
industry and generally not competitors with respect to the labor market.
Consequently, agreements among them likely are subject to the rule of
reason. Indeed, this conclusion is not particularly controversial: the
American Antitrust Institute recently proclaimed that no-poach agreements between a franchisor and franchisee are vertical restraints that are
subject to the rule of reason.64
62. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018).
63. 433 U.S. 36, 54, 59 (1977) (holding that geographical restrictions in franchise system
are subject to the rule of reason); see Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
64. Randy M. Stutz, The Evolving Antitrust Treatment of Labor-Market Restraints:
From Theory to Practice, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 18 (July 31, 2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-Labor-Antitrust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf (“However, unless the arrangement amounts to a hub-and-spoke conspiracy, an antitrust challenge
likely would have to be won under the rule of reason, which is notoriously difficult for plaintiffs.”). Subsequent to the date of this speech, the American Antitrust Institute sent the Antitrust Division a letter purporting to “clarify” its position. See Notice of Supplemental Authority in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Butler v. Jimmy John’s
Franchise, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-00133, Dkt. No. 87-1 [hereinafter Letter] (S.D. Ill. May 8, 2019)
(attaching Letter from Diana Moss, President, and Randy Stutz, Vice President of Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute, to the Hon. Makan Delrahim, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust
Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Michael Murray, Dep. Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 2, 2019)). The letter attempts to recast its prior statement as
part of its legislative advocacy program and as a mere description of “fallacious defense arguments”. See id. at 1-2. But its prior statement simply declares that, with respect to “nopoaching commitments from franchisees . . . unless the arrangement amounts to a hub-andspoke conspiracy, an antitrust challenge likely would have to be won under the rule of reason,
which is notoriously difficult for plaintiffs.” See Randy M. Stutz, The Evolving Antitrust
Treatment of Labor-Market Restraints: From Theory to Practice, AM. ANTITRUST INST. 18
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If, however, the entities are not vertically related but rather horizontally related as competitors in the labor market, then they have entered into a classic market allocation.65 As Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. reaffirmed, agreements among competitors to
divide markets are per se unlawful,66 absent a significant caveat.67 That
per se rule extends to customer allocation schemes for new or existing
customers, geographic divisions, and even seemingly small divisions of
markets.68

(July 31, 2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-LaborAntitrust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf . Although it may be more expedient to reframe that declaration now that AAI is advocating before courts instead of state legislatures, its prior statement
makes no mention of or even any allusion to this position being part of “fallacious defense
arguments.” Letter, at 2. AAI next mischaracterizes the Antitrust Division’s Statement of Interest as arguing that courts should “apply the full-blown rule of reason to vertical no-poaching agreements based on the possibility that they could be ancillary to the broader franchise
agreement” and consequently “ignor[ing] that a restraint could only be removed from the
quick look category if a court were to ‘conclude’ that the restraint is ancillary,” see Letter at
2, 3, when in fact the Statement argued just that: “In the latter situation where a court concludes that the no-poach agreement is ancillary, then, by definition, quick look analysis is not
appropriate.” Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Butler v. Jimmy John’s
Franchise, LLC, No. 3:18-cv-00133, Dkt. No. 82-5 (“Statement of Interest”), at 17 (E.D. Wa.
Mar. 7, 2019). Next, the letter criticizes the Statement for relying without citation on the proposition—undisputed in the case in which the Statement was filed—that quick-look analysis
does not apply to vertical arrangements. Letter, at 6. But the Supreme Court in American
Express just recently indicated that a “quick look” is inappropriate for vertical arrangements.
See Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7. The letter finally turns to what seems to be its primary
argument, that “the no-poaching agreements at issue have no known, cognizable efficiencies
and make no economic sense on their fact.” Letter, at 8. Although AAI implies to the contrary,
the Division’s Statement did not take a position on this factual issue. See generally Statement
of Interest. Regardless, on this point, several economists responded to the Institute’s letter by
arguing, in their own letter to the Antitrust Division, that there is “significant evidence that
low-skilled laborers receive training from employers that can be valuable to the employee,”
that “no-poaching clauses are consistent with such restrictions,” and that “there is no valid
evidence that no-poaching clauses in franchise agreements have a significant impact of the
level of competition for workers in labor markets.” See Letter from Daniel S. Levy, PhD, and
Timothy J. Tardiff, PhD, Advanced Analytical Consulting Group, to the Hon. Makan
Delrahim, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Michael Murray,
Dep. Ass’t Att’y Gen., Antitrust Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2 (June 11, 2019),
http://aacg.com/wp-content/uploads/AACG-Letter-to-DoJ-6-11-2019.pdf.
65. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); Continental TV, 433 U.S.
at n.28.
66. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007); see
also Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (per curiam) (explaining that “agreements between competitors to allocate territories to minimize competition are illegal”).
67. See infra Section V.B.2 (explaining under what circumstances a horizontal restraint
is not subject to the per se rule).
68. See, e.g., Palmer, 498 U.S. at 46, 49-50 (affecting the allocation of customers);
United States v. Coop. Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1368, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988)
(same); United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1088 (5th Cir. 1978)
(affecting the allocation of territories); United States v. Kemp & Assocs., 907 F.3d 1264, 1277
(10th Cir. 2018) (explaining that it does not “matter that the alleged agreement would only
affect a small number of potential customers”).
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An agreement to allocate employees is no different than one to allocate customers: one eliminates competition for employees, another for
customers.69 As the eBay court puts it, no-poach agreements are “a ‘classic’ horizontal market division.”70 The leading treatise on antitrust
law—Herbert Hovenkamp’s Antitrust Law—takes the same position.71
Competitors, of course, must actually have entered into an agreement, as opposed to merely engaged in parallel conduct.72 Parallel conduct arises most often when “competitors adopt[] similar policies around
the same time in response to similar market conditions.”73 Although it
“may constitute circumstantial evidence of anticompetitive behavior,”
“mere parallel conduct is as consistent with agreement among competitors as it is with independent conduct in an interdependent market.”74
Consequently, some courts “distinguish[] permissible parallel conduct
from impermissible conspiracy by looking for certain ‘plus factors.’ ” 75
Gone also are the days when a hub-and-spoke-conspiracy could be
established without a establishing a rim around the spokes.76 Some advocates characterized older cases as allowing plaintiffs to establish a single conspiracy among competitors (the spokes) subject to the per se rule
by showing that each competitor (each spoke) separately entered into an
agreement with a common defendant (the hub).77 Subsequent cases have
69. United States v. eBay, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1038-39 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (explaining that “[a]ntitrust law does not treat employment markets differently from other markets” with respect to a classic horizontal market division).
70. eBay, 968 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-39; see also In re High-Tech Employee Antitrust
Litig., 856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1115 n.9, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2012); see Weisfeld v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 84 F. App’x 257, 260 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) (unpublished per curiam) (suggesting that a
conspiracy between competitors not to hire each other’s employees could be unlawful per se).
71. 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2013B at 148 (3d ed. 2012); see also
Suresh Naidu, Eric A. Posner, & Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power,
132 HARV. L. REV. 536, 544 (2018) (“This type of horizontal agreement is a clear violation
of the Sherman Act.”); see Rochella T. Davis, Talent Can’t Be Allocated: A Labor Economics
Justification for No-Poaching Agreement Criminality in Antitrust Regulation, 12 BROOK. J.
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 279, 284 (2018) (identifying “antipoaching agreements that are
squarely per se violations”).
72. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007); In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2015).
73. In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1193.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1194.
76. See id. at 1192-93.
77. See, e.g., Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d 193, 203 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
position attributed by advocate to Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc.,
459 F.2d 138, 146 (6th Cir.1972)); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 33132 (3d Cir. 2010) (rejecting position attributed by advocate to Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), and Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 221 F.3d 928 (7th
Cir. 2000)); see generally In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1193 n.3 (“We note, however, one key difference between a rimless hub-and-spoke conspiracy (i.e., a collection of
purely vertical agreements) and a rimmed hub-and-spoke conspiracy (i.e., a collection of vertical agreements joined by horizontal agreements): courts analyze vertical agreements under
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made clear, however, that such facts do not establish a conspiracy among
the competitors subject to the per se rule but rather a series of conspiracies subject to the rule of reason, unless there are allegations of agreements among the competitors (the rim).78 But, of course, if there is a
rim, then there is little point in using the hub-and-spoke analogy: that is
really just a horizontal agreement among competitors that also happens
to include a non-competitor.79
2. Ancillarity
The next question that must be asked concerns the ancillary restraints doctrine. Even a horizontal restraint is not subject to the per se
rule if it is “subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction,” and reasonably necessary to “make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose.”80 Whether a particular restraint
meets this standard depends on the facts of the case. In one leading case,
for example, the D.C. Circuit closely analyzed the facts of the interstate
moving van business to hold that a company’s policy to terminate certain
moving agents with operations independent of the company was ancillary to a larger project of organizing an interstate networks of moving
services.81 Similarly, in a franchise case, the ancillary restraints question
turns on the relationship between the no-poach agreement and the franchise system, particularly its promotion of inter-brand competition.82
The answer may not be the same for every franchise system.83 All told,
then, there are two ways for a no-poach agreement to be subject to the
rule of reason and not the per se rule: verticality and ancillarity.

the rule of reason, whereas horizontal agreements are violations per se. This distinction provides strong incentives for plaintiffs to plead a horizontal conspiracy (either alone or as part
of a rimmed hub-and-spoke conspiracy). The prospect of establishing a violation per se is
much more appealing to plaintiffs than the potential difficulty and costliness of proving a § 1
claim under the rule of reason.” (internal citations omitted)).
78. See, e.g., In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1193; In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust
Litig., 618 F.3d at 327 (3d Cir. 2010); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309 F.3d at 203-04 (4th
Cir. 2002); Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552
F.3d 430, 435 (6th Cir. 2008); see generally 12 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶
1402c (3d ed. 2012) (collecting cases).
79. In re Musical Instruments, 798 F.3d at 1192 n.3 (“for what is a wheel without a
rim?”).
80. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Bork, J.); see also Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2006) (stating the rule of reason
applies to joint ventures); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898) (Taft, J.).
81. See Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 211, 224.
82. Conrad, 2019 WL 2754864, at *1-3; Ogden v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. et al.,
No. 18-12792, 630 (E.D. Mich. July 29, 2019).
83. See, e.g., Conrad, 2019 WL 2754864, at *2 (“[I]f the facts of this case show that the
no-poach agreements are not ancillary restraints, then the DOJ’s theory may not apply.”).
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3. “Quick Look”
But a final question still remains: Should such a restraint be analyzed under the full rule of reason or the quick look doctrine? The quick
look doctrine is a rarely-applicable version of the rule of reason analysis
that is appropriate only when “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangement in question would have an anticompetitive effect.”84 The doctrine recently has
been criticized,85 and its exact contours have been said to be “lack[ing]
definition” by Professor Hovenkamp.86 But one thing that is clear is that
the quick look doctrine is not supposed to be an intermediate third category of analysis: it is not some kind of compromise between the per se
rule and the rule of reason, or invoked whenever a court thinks, for example, that a particular restraint is too hard to classify.87 To the extent
that recent court decisions embody that reasoning, they deserve further
scrutiny.88
The foregoing questions are those that should be asked when considering no-poach agreements. I have not attempted to answer all these
questions, even in hypotheticals, because the answers depend on the
facts, and they vary. In addition, delving into the particular facts of every
no-poach case is not in the interest of the United States. What is in our
interest is that courts administer the antitrust laws properly with the rigor
and nuance that the foregoing questions would entail.
VI. CONCLUSION
I have explained that the purpose of our amicus program is to promote the interest of the United States that courts properly apply the antitrust laws. So we watch cases, taking on the role of tireless advocate
for the right answer, whether it benefits plaintiffs, defendants, workers,

84. California Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
85. See Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories: Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 839 (2016) (“Support for the
quick look reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the cost of implementing this approach
and the link between the standard for per se liability and quick look analysis.”); see also Edward D. Cavanagh, Whatever Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 39, 67
(2017) (“The lower courts have been reluctant to embrace quick look analysis. Among plaintiffs, only the FTC has actively (and effectively) advocated for the concept of presumptive
illegality.”).
86. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rule of Reason, 70 FLA. L. REV. 81, 126 (2018) (“Another problem with the so-called quick look is that it lacks definition.”).
87. Compare Meese, supra note 85, at 880 (advocating for principled basis for departing
from rule of reason for quick look), with Robert Pitofsky, Are Retailers Who Offer Discounts
Really “Knaves”?: The Coming Challenge to the Dr. Miles Rule, 21 ANTITRUST 61, 65 (2007)
(advocating for quick look as a “compromise”).
88. See, e.g., Butler, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 797; Deslandes, 2018 WL 3105955 at *7-8;
Order, Yi, No. 18-5627, at *9-10.
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employers, or others. I also have explained a nuanced and complex
framework for the no-poach space, based on the historical relationship
between the antitrust laws and the labor markets. We do not have all of
the answers, but we think these are the right questions: whether the
agreeing entities can act concertedly, whether they are horizontal competitors, whether their agreement is ancillary to a larger arrangement,
and whether they merit a quick look.
This discussion endeavors to both argue and demonstrate that we
are motivated in both instances by our devotion to the rule of law. Our
only job is to see that justice is done.

